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SUNSHINE PROPOSALS FOR IMAGING OWNERSHIP AND
DRUG/MEDICAL DEVICE MANUFACTURER RELATIONSHIPS:
PHYSICIAN DISCLOSURES AND THE LIMITS OF
CONSUMERISM IN HEALTH CARE
Jackson Williams *
As the health care system contends with higher costs arising from
growth in imaging services and the use of expensive pharmaceuticals and
medical devices, policymakers have focused on possible conflicts-of-
interest on the part of physicians. Physicians are responsible for ordering
imaging studies, prescribing drugs, and choosing medical devices for im-
plantation, and it is widely believed that physicians' decision making can
be influenced by their financial interests.'
Researchers studying physician ownership of imaging equipment
have found that physicians who perform their own imaging are 1.7 to 7.7
times as likely to order imaging as peers who do not.2 Studies on the im-
pact of gifts and honoraria from drug manufacturers have concluded that
recipients are quicker to prescribe new drugs and more likely to prescribe
brand medications with no demonstrated advantage over cheaper generic
drugs.3 Payments by medical device manufacturers to surgeons who im-
plant their products have resulted in both civil litigation and criminal
prosecutions.
A study by the McKinsey Global Institute estimated that the prolifera-
tion of advanced imaging equipment in the U.S., driven by physician own-
ership, adds $40 billion to America's health care costs annually; and found
that prescription of new, brand medications for diabetes and pulmonary
conditions by U.S. doctors is nearly double the rate of their peers in the
* Jackson Williams is a graduate from Loyola University of Chicago School of Law and has completed his
Ph.D. for public policy analysis at the university of Illinois at Chicago. He is currently the Director of
Government Relations at the National Certification Board for Therapeutic Massage Bodywork.
1 Shankar Vedantam, Doctors Reap Benefits By Doing Own Tests, Wash. Post, July 31, 2009.
2 Brian E. Kouri, R. Gregory Parsons & Hillel R. Alpert, Physician Self-Referral for Diagnostic Imaging:
Review of the Empiric Literature, 179 AM. J. ROENTGENOLOGY 843, 845 (2002).
3 Ashley Wazana, Physicians and the Pharmaceutical Industry: Is a Gift Ever Just a Gift?, 283 JAMA
373, 378 (2000).
4 Janet Moore, Medical device payments to doctors draw scrutiny, MINNEAPOLIS STAR-TRIB., September
8, 2008.
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United Kingdom and Germany and six times that of Japanese doctors.
Legislation introduced in Congress would address these issues by
mandating disclosure of financial interests. One bill, the Medicare Imaging
Disclosure Sunshine Act,6 would require that when a physician self-refers
for advanced imaging, the referring physician inform the patient in writing
that the patient may obtain the services elsewhere and provide the patient
with a written list of other suppliers.
Another proposal, the Physician Payments Sunshine Act, would re-
quire drug and device manufacturers to report gifts and payments to physi-
cians, with the information made available to patients and the general
public through an online database.
Are disclosures of physician financial interests to patients a practical
method of improving the efficiency and quality of health care? This article
reviews the problems that the current proposals are intended to address
and evaluates the legislation in light of experience with and expert opinion
on disclosures to consumers and patients. It will also touch upon possible
alternative policy approaches.
"CONSUMERISM" IN HEALTH CARE
AND THE ROLE OF DISCLOSURE
Health economist James Robinson has argued that policies aimed at
promoting greater value in health care generally follow one of two para-
digms-managed competition, in which transactions are aggregated up to
the level of a health plan or integrated delivery system and an overarching
consumer choice is made at that level; or consumerism, in which patient
choices are increasingly devolved to the individual transaction level. In
the first model, consumers are given information about the health plan's
overall performance and price, and many decisions about specific aspects
of health care, such as whether to offer an imaging procedure or whether
to prescribe a generic or brand drug, are made by the health plan or the
physicians it employs.9 In the consumerist model, detailed information
about cost, quality and treatment options are presented to the patient at
each oint of service and the patient is invited to "direct" his or her own
care.
5 Carlos Angrisano, Accounting for the cost of health care in the United States, (January 2007).
6 S. 3343, I10th Cong. (2008); H.R. 6821, 110th Cong. (2008).
7S.301, I lh Cong. (2009).
8 James C. Robinson, Managed Consumerism In Health Care, 24 HEALTH AFF. 1478 (2005).
9 Id.
10 Id.
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The notion of an informed consumer choosing among multiple op-
tions in a competitive marketplace has been the goal of consumer protec-
tion policy in many sectors of the economy, but the consumerist model is a
relative newcomer to health policy. For about two decades, the prevailing
thought in health policy circles has been that the complexity of health care
militated in favor of macro-level competition among health plans that
would serve as intermediaries between patients and providers and manage
their care." Measures of health plan quality, such as CAHPS and HEDIS,
are well-developed,12 and price competition is simplified at the health plan
level. By contrast, the measures of individual provider quality and effi-
ciency necessary to enable consumer-directed care are still in their in-
fancy.13
The two sunshine proposals follow the consumerist paradigm to dif-
fering degrees. The drug and device disclosure bill is compatible with both
models, as it would inform decisionmaking by health plans as well as by
consumers. But the imaging disclosure bill very explicitly contemplates
decisionmaking by the individual consumer, in a context that, I will argue
later, pushes the limits of what degree of engagement is reasonable to ex-
pect from patients.
Each proposal would expand on earlier private or state initiatives.14
Indiana and Texasl6 are among states that have required disclosures of
self-referrals to some facilities, and physician owners of ambulatory surgi-
cal centers have the option of disclosing their interests to patients to avoid
violating the federal Anti-Kickback Statute. A number of states have re-
quired drug manufacturers to report payments to physicians, although con-
sumer advocates have found these early efforts unsatisfactory, 8 and two
manufacturers have agreed to begin disclosing some arrangements volun-
tarily."
11 Alain C. Enthoven & Laura A. Tollen, Competition In Health Care: It Takes Systems To Pursue Quality
and Efficiency, HEALTH AFF. WEB EXCLUSIVE, September 7, 2005, available at http://content.health
affairs.org/cgi/reprint/hithaff.w5.420vl.
12 See, Eric C. Schneider et al., National Quality Monitoring of Medicare Health Plans: The Relationship
Between Enrollees' Reports and the Quality of Clinical Care, 39 MED. CARE 1313 (2001).
13 Sarah Hudson Scholle et al., Benchmarking Physician Performance: Reliability of Individual and Com-
posite Measures, 14 AM. J. OF MANAGED CARE 833 (2008).
14 See Ariel Winter & Jeff Stensland, Public reporting of physicians' financial relationships: Policy op-
tions, Staff presentation to the Medicare Payment Advisory Commission (Sept. 4, 2008).
15 IND. CODE ANN. § 25-22.5-11-3 (West. 2008).
16 22 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 190.8(2)(H) (2008).
17 42 C.F.R. § 1001.952; Clarification of the Initial OIG Safe Harbor Provisions, Part V, 64 Fed. Reg.
63518 (Nov. 19, 1999).
18 Joseph Ross et al., Pharmaceutical Company Payments to Physicians Early Experiences With Disclo-
sure Laws in Vermont and Minnesota, 297 JAMA 1216 (2007).
19 E-mail from Allan Coukell, Community Catalyst, to Sarah Thomas, AARP Public Policy Institute Oct.
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Disclosures to consumers can be mandated with two general effects in
mind. One possible intention of such laws can be for disclosure to have a
"chilling" effect on the disclosing parties and deter them from pursuing the
activity in the first place. Referrals to facilities in which a physician has a
financial interest (often called "self-referrals") are already illegal under
20
many circumstances. Physician acceptance of ifts or payments from
drug and device manufacturers is controversial and many physicians
22
voluntarily decline to accept them for ethical reasons. When there is gen-
eral disapproval of an activity, but policymakers feel constrained from out-
lawing it entirely, disclosure is a middle-ground policy option.23 The in-
tended effect is a sense of shame or embarrassment on the part of the
provider that will lead to eventual curtailment of the activity. This effect
could be magnified by the ability of researchers to study disclosure data
and publicize findings that inform policymaking.
The second possible intention is for the consumer to consider the pro-
vider's conflict of interest in deciding whether to follow the provider's
recommendation (in this case, of an imaging facility or prescription drug
or medical device). In the contexts in which such disclosures have typi-
cally been mandated, such as financial services, the consumer is expected
to use the information to decide whether to seek a better bargain else-
where, usually based on price. In the health care context, however, the dis-
closure engages the patient in evaluating the medical advice he or she is
given-an even more complex task than shopping for loans or inquiring
about financial advisors' fees.
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PHYSICIAN
FINANCIAL INTERESTS AND HEALTH CARE COSTS
According to the Government Accountability Office, Medicare
spending for imaging services more than doubled from 2000 to 2006.24
28, 2008, 00:00:00 CST) (on file with author).
20 E.g., under the "Stark Law," 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn (2008).
21 The discussion here focuses on gifts and payments that do not appear reasonably related to any work
done by the physician. A physician may have had a bona fide role in investigating the efficacy of drug or
inventing a medical device, which roles differ from that of paid endorser. Further, patients are likely to
have a different reaction to being informed that their physician played an intellectual role in developing the
treatment which they will undergo, as opposed to receiving a gratuity.
22 See, e.g., Surgeons for Sale: Conflict and Consultant Payment in the Medical Device Industry: Hearing
before the U.S. Senate Special Committee on Aging l l0th Cong. 16 (2008) (Testimony of Dr. Charles D.
Rosen, President, Ass'n for Ethics in Spine Surgery).
23 However, there is in fact legislation pending in Congress to completely abolish the exception to Stark.
See H.R. 2962, Ill Cong. (2009).
24 Government Accountability Office, Medicare Part B Imaging Services: Rapid Spending Growth and
Shift to Physician Offices Indicate Need for CMS to Consider Additional Management Practices, at II
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GAO's analysis of the 6-year period linked this spending growth to imag-
ing services provided in physician offices under an exception to the federal
law banning self-referral. GAO found that the proportion of Medicare
spending on imaging services performed in physicians' offices grew from
58 percent to 64 percent, and that physicians were earning an increasing
26share of their Medicare revenue from imaging services.
That all imaging services may not be necessary or appropriate is sug-
gested by the substantial variation in imaging spending per beneficiary
across geographic regions of the country. In 2005, spending per benefici-
ary on advanced imaging ranged from $126 in Vermont to $280 in Flor-
ida.27 Spending on in-office imaging varied even more almost eight-fold
between those states. No knowledgeable observer believes that differ-
29
ences in health among patients explain the wide variation.
In addition to the $14 billion cost of physician imaging services to the
Medicare program (and billions more to private insurers), q3uestions about
safety and quality are also raised by the growth in imaging. 0 Some imag-
ing procedures expose patients to radiation which, over the long term, may
increase the incidence of cancer.3 1 Inspections of outpatient imaging facili-
ties have found that their compliance with quality standards compares un-
favorably to that of hospitals.
While spending on prescription drugs continues to rise, primarily due
to price and utilization increases, spending growth has been curtailed
through utilization management and other efforts of health plans, pharma-
ceutical benefit managers, state-sponsored "academic detailers" and mass
retailers to encourage substitution of generic drugs for more expensive
branded drugs.33 However, brand-name pharmaceutical companies con-
tinue to vigorously combat these efforts with aggressive marketing tac-
tics.34
(June 2008).
25 Id. at 19.
26 Id. at 20.
27 Id. at 21
28 Id.
29 See Elliott Fisher and David Wennberg, Variations in the Longitudinal Efficiency of Academic Medical
Centers, 2004 Health Aff. Suppl. Web Exclusives VARI9-32 (2004), available at http://content.health af-
fairs.org/cgi/reprint/hlthaff.var. 19v l.pdf.
30 America's Health Insurance Plans, White Paper: Ensuring Quality through Appropriate Use of Diagnos-
tic Imaging 30 (July 2008).
3 1 Id.
32 Id.
33 David J. Gross, Rx Watchdog Report: Trends in Manufacturer Prices of Brand Name. Prescription
Drugs Used by Medicare Beneficiaries, 2002 to 2007, - (March, 2008).
34 Id.
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By one estimate, drug manufacturers spent nearly $30 billion on mar-
keting in 2005, about 85 percent of which was devoted to promoting drugs
directly to physicians. According to the Kaiser Family Foundation, the
industry spends between $8,000 and $13,000 per physician per year on
such marketing.36 Spending takes the form of free meals, sports tickets,
continuing education seminars, travel reimbursement, and consulting fees,
with the most generous payments made to physicians thought to be opin-
ion leaders in their field or who sit on committees that promulgate practice
guidelines or formularies. 37
The generic fill rate improved in 2007 to about 67%.38 (A point of
reference: the generic fill rate could rise as high as 80% without adversely
affecting patients, 39 although this is a moving target as a growing propor-
tion of prescriptions are for specialty drugs with no generic equivalent.)
Further increases in generic utilization could result in substantial cost sav-
ings; consulting firm IMS Health has estimated that a 1 percent increase in
generic utilization would yield almost $4 billion in savings.40 Further sav-
ings could come from prescribing within-class and across-class alterna-
tives.41 Some experts argue that drugs are over-prescribed in the first in-
stance, to patients who don't really benefit from them, and that these
prescribin 2practices are fueled by pharmaceutical companies' payments
to doctors.
THE IMPACT OF DISCLOSURE
ON CONSUMER CHOICES
Financial interest disclosures have long been prominent in consumer
protection laws governing real estate and investment transactions. These
transactions are in some ways analogous to those in the health care con-
text. First, the consumer is relying on the advice of an expert who is in a
position to make referrals. Second, payments are made on fee-for-service
basis, so that each individual service represents an opportunity for some
35 Pharmaceutical Industry Marketing, FACT SHEET (Community Catalyst), Jan. 28, 2009, at 1.
36 Prescription Drug Trends, FACT SHEET (Kaiser Family Foundation, Menlo Park, CA), Sept. 2008, at .
37 Id.
38 Press Release, IMS Health, IMS Health Reports U.S. Prescription Sales Grew 3.8 Percent in 2007 to
$286.5 Billion (Mar. 12, 2008) (on file with author).
39 Ed Weisbart, Presentation: Taming Pharmacy: Driving Out Waste One Consumer at a Time (2008).
40 K. Jaeger, Generic Medicines Are Key to Medicaid Reform, PHARMACY TIMES, - (Aug. 2005).
41 E-mail from Allan Coukell, Community Catalyst, to Sarah Thomas, AARP Public Policy Institute (Oct.
28, 2008)(on file with author).
42 John Carey, Do Cholesterol Drugs Do Any Good? Bus. WK., Jan. 17, 2008, available at
http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/08 04/b4068052092994.htm.
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service provider to gain revenue and for the referring party to potentially
capture some share of that revenue.
In the consumer financial services context, the disclosure of the refer-
ring party's conflict of interest is intended to alert the consumer to the pos-
sibility that a service or product might be obtained for a lower price else-
where. Scenarios that might require disclosure include a real estate
broker's referral to a title insurer, a mortgage broker's referral to a lender,
or a registered investment advisor's referral to a stock broker. In the first
of these examples the broker may self-refer to a title agency she owns her-
self; in all three examples there is the possibility of side payments made to
the referring party.
There are two principal differences between the consumer financial
services setting and the health care setting. The first is that price competi-
tion has less prominence in the health care context. For instance, a CT or
MRI scan will cost most insured patients the same-the amount of the ap-
plicable co-payment, or co-insurance in Medicare-regardless of where
they obtain it. In contrast, a cost-conscious and savvy consumer can find
or negotiate lower title insurance or loan fees, especially because price
disclosures under the Real Estate Settlement Practices Act (RESPA)4 and
Truth in Lending Act (TILA)44 facilitate some degree of price comparison.
Price competition is a factor in choosing between generic drugs and brand
drugs, but the physician has the last word on what drug to prescribe.
The second difference is that referrals in the consumer financial ser-
vices setting are generally made for products that are obtained as a matter
of course rather than recommended through the referring party's exercise
of professional judgment. The mortgage broker does not tell a homebuyer
that he needs a loan; the consumer has already determined that for himself.
A real estate broker or attorney does not decide that title insurance must be
purchased; that service is required in all real estate transactions involving a
lender. The consumer's primary concern is getting the best price, not being
sold an unnecessary product. 45
By contrast, the primary issue implicated in the health care context is
whether a recommended product or service is necessary or instead consti-
tutes over-utilization influenced by the physician's financial interest. Also
relevant to a greater degree is the quality of the service to be provided-
43 Real Estate Settlement Practices Act, 12 U.S.C. § 2601, et seq.
44 Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1601 et seq.
45 Notable exceptions are subprime mortgage refinancings and credit life insurance; however, these are
products, unlike a course of medical treatment, that a layperson can ordinarily decide whether to purchase
without receiving expert professional advice.
1372010]
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the performance records of a title insurer or lender are of little concern to
the consumer purchasing those services, but the quality of an imaging scan
and its interpretation could be a matter of life and death for the patient.
Evaluating a doctor's prescription of a brand drug or medical device
involves considerations of price, quality and safety, and its necessity in the
first place. Untangling these matters requires questioning a physician's
professional judgment and/or good faith-an "awkward conversation to
have",46_and a degree of knowledge or research on the patient's part that
would go far beyond calling for price quotes.
EVALUATING THE DISCLOSURE PROPOSALS
Miller and Sage offer a framework for evaluatin proposals for re-
quiring disclosure of physician financial incentives. Their immediate
concern, writing in the era of managed care's zenith, was physician incen-
tives to limit treatment due to capitation.48 They noted, however, that in-
centives to over-provide in a FFS setting were of equal concern, and
opined that "patients need basic information about financial incentives to
understand how different approaches to physician compensation might
shape treatment options presented to them." They put forth four basic
principles that apply to the proposals discussed here:
* "enrollees need a context for disclosed information," 50
* "disclosure needs are likely to differ by population, according
to variables such as age, health, and socioeconomic status," s1
* disclosed information must not be so detailed that it confuses
readers or obscures essential points,"52
* "disclosure must be customized to achieve specific goals." 53
Over all, they argue, "disclosure of incentives should not be done in
isolation but should be part of an integrated communications strategy."54
46 Ibby Caputo, Probing Doctors' Ties to Industry, WASH. POST, August 18, 2009, available at
http://grassley.senate.gov/upload/Health.pdf.
47 Tracy E. Miller and William M. Sage, Disclosing Physician Financial Incentives, 281 JAMA 1424
(1999).
48 Id. at 1425.
49 Miller & Sage, supra note 47, at 1425.
50 Id.
51 Id.
52 Id.
53 Id.
54 Id.
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The Medicare Imaging Disclosure Sunshine Act
S. 3343 would require that when a physician self-refers for advanced
imaging, "the referring physician [must] inform the individual in writing at
the time of the referral that the individual may obtain the services for
which the individual is being referred from a person other than [the doctor
eligible for the ancillary services exemption from the Stark law] and pro-
vide such individual with a written list of suppliers... who furnish such
services in the area in which such individual resides.,s
In one respect the disclosure contemplated by this bill resembles the
one that must be made by real estate brokers and attorneys when they refer
a client to an affiliated title insurer for settlement services. Under that re-
quirement, found in a rule promulgated by HUD under the Real Estate Set-
56tement Practices Act, a self-referring party in real estate must make the
following disclosure in writing:
This is to give you notice that (referring party) has a business rela-
tionship with [settlement services provider(s)]. Because of this rela-
tionship, this referral may provide [referring party] a financial or
other benefit. Set forth below is the estimated charge or range of
charges for the settlement services listed. You are NOT required to
use the listed provider(s) as a condition for [settlement of you loan
on] [or] [purchase, sale, or refinance of] the subject property.
THERE ARE FREQUENTLY OTHER SETTLEMENT SERVICE
PROVIDERS AVAILABLE WITH SIMILAR SERVICES. YOU
ARE FREE TO SHOP AROUND TO DETERMINE THAT YOU
ARE RECEIVING THE BES SERVICES AND THE BEST
RATE FOR THESE SERVICES.
Both of these disclosures are intended to alert the consumer that other
service providers are available. But there are crucial differences. First,
given that Medicare fees are the same in an area, there is no reason for
beneficiaries to shop for a better price. Second, while it is possible to make
rudimentary quality determinations about imaging providers, this informa-
tion is not readily available to patients. Medicare has no quality compari-
son tools for imaging. Quality determinations are usually made by private
insurers or by accrediting bodies. And if self-referred imaging in an in-
office facility is offered immediately, the disclosure would not occur in a
time frame encouraging research or reflection.
55 S. 3343, 110' Cong. § 2 (2008), available at http://www.govtrack.us/congress/billtext.xpd?bill=sl 10-
3343.
56 24 C.F.R. § 3500. 1, et seq. (2008).
57 Id. at § 3500 App. D.
58 America's Health Insurance Plans, supra note 30.
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As Miller and Sage noted, for disclosures to be useful the patient must
be given context and the disclosure should be customized to achieve its
goal. The disclosure mandated by the bill contains no context, i.e., the
beneficiary is not informed that physician owners of imaging equipment
order many times more studies, nor about any potential harm from radia-
tion. By giving the patient a list of providers it obscures the essential point,
because price and quality competition are not implicated. It is not custom-
ized to achieve the intended goal: for patients to obtain imaging studies
that are warranted by clinical evidence and are not wasteful or duplicative.
Indeed, whether any disclosure could accomplish this goal is ques-
tionable. Alerting patients to the problems behind self-referral-the possi-
bility that the procedure is unnecessary or unsafe-might not meet another
Miller/Sage goal, striking the proper balance "between educating patients
and alarming them."59 Finally, it is not clear that patients have the tools to
evaluate the physician's judgment call that a test is needed. In some cases
there may be consensus clinical guidelines to follow, but patients are
unlikely to have the wherewithal to determine whether a guideline applies
to the patient's circumstance nor whether the doctor complied with it.
Some insurers have instituted utilization review or credentialing of
physicians to curtail unnecessary imaging.60 Utilization review attempts to
apply guidelines to individual circumstances. Credentialing programs
discern a tendency for over-utilization from a physician's overall pattern
of ordering, not individual appropriateness within a likely grey area.
These processes enlist knowledgeable intermediaries rather than layper-
sons as battlers for health care efficiency. As advocates of the "managed
competition" paradigm argue, such intermediaries may be better posi-
tioned to assemble and synthesize information about medical evidence and
practitioner proclivities than patients who are likely to be preoccupied by
worries over the symptoms that sent them to see a doctor in the first in-
stance. Using intermediary techniques is an alternative to the disclosure
approach, and has been endorsed in the reports of the GAO and the health
insurers' trade association, America's Health Insurance Plans, cited above.
59 Miller & Sage, supra note 47, at 1428. See also, Daylian Cain, George Loewenstein, & Don A. Moore,
The Dirt on Coming Clean: Perverse Effects of Disclosing Conflicts of Interest, 34 J. LEGAL STUD. 1
(2005).
60 See America's Health Insurance Plans, supra note 30.
61 Id.
62 Id.
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The Physician Payments Sunshine Act
S. 301 would require drug and medical device manufacturers to report
cash payments and in-kind transfers to physicians, including gifts, food,
entertainment, travel, honoraria and consulting fees. 63 The disclosures
would be made to the federal government, and would be made public on a
searchable Internet website.64 The intent is to create a public disclosure re-
gime similar to those governing campaign finance and publicly-held cor-
porations. As with those disclosure systems, it is expected that the media,
researchers, and institutional stakeholders, rather than individuals, would
be the primary audience. However, one sponsor, Senator Claire McCaskill,
stated that "empowering patients to talk with their doctors about the drugs
they are prescribed" was a purpose of the bill.65 Ideally, disclosures would
act synergistically, with media reporting spurring patients to initiate indi-
vidual research and conversations.
Compared to the proposal for imaging disclosure, disclosures of rela-
tionships with drug and device manufacturers offer, at least theoretically,
greater potential for allowing patients to act on the disclosed information.
Patients could access the information prior to beginning a relationship
with a physician or before any visit to the physician for which the informa-
tion would be relevant. They could also access the information after a visit
but before filling a prescription (e.g., after learning of a medication's
status on their insurer's formulary). But such scenarios may be over-
optimistic, as research has indicated that even patients for whom drug
costs are an issue seldom initiate conversations with their doctors about
66
alternatives to expensive prescriptions.
There is considerable contextual information available for evaluating
the disclosures, such as Consumer Union's Best Buy Drugs or Public Citi-
zen's Best Pills, Worst Pills publications. Drug costs are typically reflected
in insurers' tiered co-payment structures, allowing consumers to assess,
with relative ease, cost-effectiveness of competing therapies within a
common or related therapeutic class(es). 67
63 S. 301, 11I' Cong. §1 128G(a) (2009).
64 S. 301, §l128G(c)(1)(C).
65 Press Release, Claire E. McCaskill, McCaskill Introduces Legislation to Curb Drug Industry Influence
(Sept. 6, 2007).
66 See John D. Piette, Michele Heisler, & Todd H. Wagner, Cost-Related Medication Underuse: Do Pa-
tients With Chronic Illnesses Tell Their Doctors?, 164 ARCHIVES OF INTERNAL MED. 1749 (2004).
67 See Becky Briesacher et al., Three-tiered-copayment drug coverage and use of nonsteroidal anti-
inflammatory drugs, 164 ARCHIVES OF INTERNAL MED. 1679 (2004).
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If the goals of the disclosure system are to encourage the prescription
of generic drugs when possible, avoid unnecessary prescribing, and delay
the prescription of newer brand drugs until they show a demonstrable ad-
vantage over cheaper ones, the disclosures seem as well-tailored as one
could hope to achieving those goals. A recent survey concluded that at
least half of all Americans have searched online for healthcare-related in-
formation, and that about half of those have discussed information found
online with their doctor.68 It is not hard to imagine that the disclosures
could be considered by patients when choosing a doctor (as well as con-
sidered by health plans in recommending doctors). It would seem espe-
cially likely that patients would seek out and consider the information
when a doctor has recommended an invasive or relatively risky procedure
such as implantation of a medical device.
CONCLUSION
A decision to use financial interest disclosure as a tool for health care
cost containment should not be taken lightly. Crafting appropriate disclo-
sure formats is in itself a complex task. For instance, HUD, in its multi-
year effort to refine RESPA disclosure requirements to encompass con-
flicts of interest on the part of mortgage brokers, conducted six rounds of
consumer testing of various iterations to ensure that the financial interest
disclosure did not obscure bottom-line price considerations. 69 The Federal
Trade Commission conducted an additional round of testing.)
Devising an appropriate disclosure in the health care setting adds
even more complexity. Financial interest disclosures by physicians could
assist patients' participation in treatment decisionmaking, or distract it. It
must be borne in mind that increasing patient involvement in decisionmak-
ing has other goals besides lowering costs. 71 For instance, motivating
medication compliance is one such goal; one research team has suggested
that cynicism about physicians' relationships with pharmaceutical compa-
72
nies could be a factor discouraging compliance.
68 Press Release, Harris Interactive, Number of "Cyberchondriacs" - Adults Going Online for Health In-
formation - Has Plateaued or Declined (July 29, 2008).
69 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT, SUMMARY REPORT: CONSUMER TESTING
OF THE GOOD FAITH ESTIMATE FORM (2008).
70 U.S. DEPT. OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT, FTC STAFF COMMENT ON PROPOSED
AMENDMENTS TO THE REGULATIONS IMPLEMENTING THE REAL ESTATE SETTLEMENT PROCEDURES ACT
("RESPA"), DOCKET No. FR-5 I 80-P-01, at 20 (June 11, 2008).
71 Vikki Entwistle & Ian Watt, Patient involvement in treatment decision-making: The case for a broader
conceptual framework, 63 PATIENT EDUC. COUNSELING 268 (2006).
72 Sarah L. Goff et al., Patients' Beliefs and Preferences Regarding Doctors' Medication Recommenda-
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Consistent with the Miller/Sage framework, disclosure requirements
should be part of an integrated communications strategy. Disclosures rele-
vant to price and quality should be presented to patients accompanied by
guidance on how to find and use price and quality information. If disclo-
sure is chosen as a means for combating overutilization, presenting pa-
tients with contextual information will be difficult in the absence of evi-
dence-based guidelines or reports comparing the physician's utilization
compared with peers. It may prove to be the case that intermediaries, such
as health plans, are the only actors capable of discerning real value in these
areas.
Finally, it is worth noting that financial interests involving ancillary
products or services are primarily of concern when those items generate
separately billed fees. When all services relevant to an overall transac-
tion-whether it is a financial transaction or an episode of care-are
grouped together and examined as a whole, allowing bottom-line price
and quality comparisons, the referring party is constrained from earning
excess benefits from additional fees.73 Thus, consumer advocates have en-
couraged "mortgage package offers" in the real estate setting74 and "wrap
fees" in the investment advice setting7 to discourage referral arrange-
ments that make transactions more costly. Health insurers have taken a
similar tack by charting the resources used by physicians across an episode
of care.76 Physicians who too readily order diagnostic tests or prescribe
expensive drugs can be excluded from insurers' preferred networks. An-
other option is to give providers a single bundled payment for an episode
of care.
The availability of these options demonstrates a superior ability of the
managed competition model to remedy the problems addressed by the sun-
shine proposals. Managed care organizations have greater resources and
advantages to identify overuse of care; although, to be sure, they also have
incentives to be excessively punctilious in doing so. But it is also evident
that sunshine measures-particularly as they relate to imaging-ask a
great deal of the patient in harnessing his or her suspicions about physi-
cians' financial interests to advance the cause of health care cost contain-
tions, 23 J. OF GEN. INTERNAL MED. 236, 236 (2008).
73 Elizabeth Renuart & Diane Thompson, The Truth, The Whole Truth and Nothing But the Truth: Fulfill-
ing the Promise of Truth in Lending, 25 YALE. J. ON REG. 181 (2008).
74 Ken Harney, 'Bundled' Settlement Fees Attracting Rate Shoppers, WASH. POST, Feb. 10, 2003.
75 Conrad de Aenlle, New Broker Fee: Bad Rap or Bad Wrap?, INT'L HERALD-TRIB., May 9, 1992.
76 Hoangmai H. Pham, Paul B. Ginsburg, Kelly McKenzie & Arnold Milstein, Redesigning Care De-
livery in Response to a High-Performance Network: The Virginia Mason Medical Center, 26 HEALTH AFF.
532 (2007).
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ment. Already the consumerism model asks patients to choose providers
using rather scanty information. While hospital quality measures are fairly
well-developed, physician quality measures are relatively primitive and
price information, because it relates to visits and procedures rather than
episodes of care, may be less than worthless.
Also provoking skepticism is the lack of any track record of previous
physician disclosure laws, such as those in Indiana and Texas, having an
impact on patient or provider behavior. This author can find no indication
that common sources of advice to consumers, such as Consumer Union or
personal finance and health beat journalists, have been able to give mean-
ingful guidance to patients in reacting to those disclosures.
In sum, lawmakers should be skeptical disclosure requirements, as
opposed to alternative policy approaches and managed care techniques,
will achieve cost containment with maximum effectiveness and minimal
confusion to patients.
77 Cf Gina Kolata, Good or Useless, Medical Scans Cost the Same, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 2, 2009.
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